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Tourism studies have shown a growing interest in the relationship between tourism and
the economy, with relevant work exploring the causal direction of effects between a country’s
international tourism presence and its overall economic performance (Schubert et al., 2011;
Ivanov and Webster, 2013; Antonakakis et al., 2015). The product of this enquiry is a mosaic of
four different interpretations (i.e. tourism–led growth, economy–driven tourism and bidirectional
or no causality) that render this area of research inconclusive and still open to discussion. A
detailed analysis of these hypotheses is offered by Brida and Pulina (2010) and Chatziantoniou
et al. (2013).
In their majority, relevant studies focus on specific destinations. However, a cross–sectional
analysis of the tourism–economy dynamics allows for a more in–depth and comparative exam-
ination of different states (Dritsakis, 2012). In addition, the use of panel data can decrease
endogeneity through the consideration of specific country effects, omitted variables, reverse
causality and measurement error. In this respect, some papers (Seetanah, 2011; Chang et al.,
2012) explore multiple countries classified on certain criteria, mostly geographic or economic.
This study introduces another factor to the said enquiry that has so far been neglected; the
destinations’ quality of political institutions.
The political economy literature has established the effects of institutional quality on the
relationship between growth and economic resources (see, Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Mehlum
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et al., 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2008), defined as the resource curse hypothesis. The latter maintains
that non–democratic countries with resource abundance tend to grow at a lower pace compared
to democratic ones, as benefits from these resources do not spillover to the wider economy but
rather they are exploited by the country’s elites. Even more, tourism resources are largely shaped
by the political environment of a destination in terms of both policy (e.g. visa requirements,
trade openness, taxes) and hospitality atmosphere (e.g. safety, security) (Kester and Croce,
2011). For example, there is evidence that extended political unrest observed in non-democratic
countries has devastating results for tourism (Fletcher and Morakabati, 2008). Given that the
political regime (as approximated by the level of democracy) in a particular country can influence
both the economy and the tourism sector, we examine the dynamic links between tourism and
economic growth in 98 countries, classified according to the quality of their political institutions,
over the period 1995-2011, using a panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach.
The quality of the political institutions is approximated based on the scores provided by
the Polity IV index (www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). Countries are classified as
democratic and non–democratic (see Table 1). Non–democratic classification denotes authori-
tarian or hybrid regimes (i.e. a mix of anocratic and autocratic regimes), whereas democratic
classification includes the democratic and full democratic political systems.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Furthermore, tourism income (proxied, for robustness purposes, by per capita international
tourism receipts, ITRCPT , per capita tourism expenditures, ITEXP , and per capita tourist
arrivals, ITARR) and per capita real GDP (in 2005 US$, GDPPC) are obtained from the
World Development Indicators database. The data sample is purely driven by data availability.
Clearly, the relationship between tourism and economic growth is a process that takes place
over time, thereby necessitating a dynamic rather than static framework. Therefore studies
focusing on the steady-state or long-run relationship between the two variables might provide a
partial understanding of this complex relationship. In contrast, our dynamic analysis allows for
capturing the adjustment in tourism and economic growth transpiring over time.
In particular, the output of the panel VAR model enables us to construct panel impulse
response functions that illustrate the time path of tourism (economic growth) following a shock
to economic growth (tourism). We therefore can observe the whole dynamic process from the
initial shock to the long-run steady-state of the series of interest.
The panel VAR methodology combines the traditional VAR approach, which treats all the
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variables in the system as endogenous. Further, the panel-data approach allows for detecting
any unobserved individual heterogeneity. In its general form, our model is the following:
∆ lnYit = A0 +A1∆ lnYit−1 +A2∆ lnYit−2 + ...+Aj∆ lnYit−j +BXit + µi + λt + εit (1)
where Yit is a vector of our key variables: ITRCPT and GDPPC. We apply the Panel VAR on
the first difference (∆) of the natural logarithm (ln) of the series instead of the level series of the
aforementioned endogenous variables, as according to Table 2, the former series are stationary,
while the latter are not. The autoregressive structure of model (1) allows all endogenous variables
to enter the model with a number of j lags. The number of lags is determined by the Akaike
Information Criterion. Xit is a vector of the exogenous variables, which are used as control
variables, comprising: (i) labour force participation rate, capturing labour input, (ii) gross fixed
capital formation as a % of GDP, measuring capital input, and (iii) imports plus exports over
GDP, capturing the degree of trade openness. The data for the exogenous variables come also
from the World Development Indicators database. µi and λt denote country fixed-effects and
time fixed-effects, respectively, and εit is the error term.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Descriptive statistics of both the endogenous variables (both in levels and in their growth
rates) and the control variables are presented in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
We begin our panel VAR analysis with the full sample results illustrated in Figure 1. Our
analysis is based on international tourism receipts as a proxy for tourism growth (the results
based on other proxies are qualitatively similar and available upon request. We have further
explored the robustness of our results by collecting data on international tourism receipts as a
% of GDP and the results lead to similar conclusions).
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
We observe that, although there is a bidirectional relationship between tourism and economic
growth in the short- to medium-run (i.e. during the first eight years), in the long-run this turns
into an economy–driven. Nevertheless, the consideration of the full sample can only lead us
to draw some tentative conclusions, as the effects of countries’ political regime remain masked.
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Therefore, we need to observe the panel VAR results of countries classified by their level of
democracy.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
As shown in Figure 2, an economic–driven tourism growth relationship is witnessed in coun-
tries with authoritarian or hybrid regimes (non–democratic countries). The interpretation of
such finding is twofold; first, it can be argued that in many instances authoritarian practices
create a turbulent environment for economic activities and hence, for all economic sectors in-
cluding tourism (Fletcher and Morakabati, 2008). This incurs in non–democratic regimes as
governments often employ a rent–seeking behaviour to gain political support rather than pro-
viding public goods (Plu¨mper and Martin, 2003).
Second, it has been established by the political economy literature that it is common for
economies which lack democracy to be controlled by a single individual or a small group of
individuals. Such power imbalances hinder the economy to grow or spread the benefits of
economic activity across society due to corruption (de Vaal and Ebben, 2011; Drury et al., 2006;
Mo, 2001). Thus, we maintain that the way the economy is controlled in non–democratic states
influences tourism growth negatively.
In contrast, countries with democratic regimes exhibit a bidirectional relationship. It is thus
suggested that these countries are able to exploit the maximum capacity of their economies and
consequently, are at a good position to support investment in their various sectors. Moreover,
given that the benefits from each sector can be shared more fairly across society, it is reasonable
to argue that sectoral performance (in our case, tourism) could assist economic growth.
Overall, the findings highlight the importance of panel country investigation of the tourism–
economy relationship based on criteria that extend beyond pure geographic and economic char-
acteristics, opening up new research questions for further investigation. For instance, an inter-
esting avenue for further research is to examine whether constraints imposed to executives could
moderate the effects of autocratic regimes on the tourism-growth relationship. Furthermore,
it would be important to explore the said relationship using a wider spectrum of institutional
qualities, e.g. military/religion in politics and civil liberties.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Panel impulse responses based on the full sample (98 countries) estimation
over the period 1995-2011
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Note: Dashed lined denote the upper and lower two standard error bands.
7
Figure 2: Cumulative Panel impulse responses for the political regime classifications estimation
over the period 1995-2011
(a) Non-democratic countries 
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(b) Democratic countries 
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Note: Dashed lined denote the upper and lower two standard error bands.
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Table 1: Democratic and Non–democratic countries
Democratic Countries Acronym Non–democratic Countries Acronym
Albania ALB Algeria DZA
Australia AUS Angola AGO
Ausria AUT Armenia ARM
Belgium BEL Azerbaijan AZE
Bolivia BOL Bahrain BHR
Brazil BRA Bangladesh BGD
Bulgaria BGR Belarus BLR
Canada CAD Burundi BDI
Cape Verde CPV Cambodia KHM
Chile CHL China CHN
Colombia COL Croatia HRV
Costa Rica CRI Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY
Cyprus CYP Ethiopia ETH
Czech Republic CZE Ghana GHA
Denmark DNK Indonesia IDN
Dominican Republic DOM Jordan JOR
Equador ECU Kazakhstan KAZ
El Salvador SLV Kenya KEN
Estonia EST Kyrgyz Republic KGZ
Finland FIN Lao PDR LAO
France FRA Malaysia MYS
Germany GER Morocco MAR
Greece GRE Nepal NPL
Guatemala GTM Pakistan PAK
Honduras HND Russian Federation RUS
Hungary HUN Sierra Leone SLE
India IND Singapore SGP
Israel ISR Sri Lanka LKA
Italy ITA Sudan SDN
Japan JPN Tanzania TZA
Korea, Republic KOR Tunisia TUN
Latvia LVA Yemen, Rep. YEM
Lesotho LSO
Lithuania LTU
Macedonia, FYR MKD
Malawi MWI
Mali MLI
Mauritius MUS
Mexico MEX
Moldova MDA
Mongolia MNG
Namibia NAM
Netherlands NLD
New Zealand NZL
Nicaragua NIC
Norway NOR
Panama PAN
Paraguay PRY
Peru PER
Philippines PHL
Poland POL
Portugal PRT
Romania ROM
Slovak Republic SVK
Slovenia SVN
South Africa ZAF
Spain ESP
Sweden SWE
Switzerland CHE
Thailand THA
Turkey TUR
Ukraine UKR
United Kingdom GBR
United States USA
Uruguay URY
Venezuela, RB VEN
Notes: The classification of the countries follows the Polity IV index
(www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.. Democratic countries have a score between 6 and 10, whereas
Non–democratic countries have a score between -10 and 5.
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Table 2: Panel unit root test results
H0: Unit root
Variables LLC IPS
All countries GDPPC 14.9273 [1.0000] 14.5849 [1.0000]
ITARR 6.38613 [1.0000] 12.2931 [1.0000]
ITEXP 10.5711 [1.0000] 13.9148 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 9.15499 [1.0000] 15.3101 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -22.9591*** [0.0000] -16.0302*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -26.5981*** [0.0000] -21.6933*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -26.3411*** [0.0000] -21.3366*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -24.1736*** [0.0000] -19.8480*** [0.0000]
Democratic GDPPC 0.33128 [0.6298] 7.63060 [1.0000]
ITARR 1.55027 [0.9395] 6.94614 [1.0000]
ITEXP 5.62630 [1.0000] 10.2915 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 4.88539 [1.0000] 10.6755 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -11.1086*** [0.0000] -7.37000*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -28.5028*** [0.0000] -13.9675*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -15.4838*** [0.0000] -11.9835*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -19.5151*** [0.0000] -12.9864*** [0.0000]
Non–democratic GDPPC 6.56751 [1.0000] 10.3759 [1.0000]
ITARR 6.18564 [1.0000] 8.48405 [1.0000]
ITEXP 7.05923 [1.0000] 8.86300 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 7.07785 [1.0000] 9.46524 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -4.32970*** [0.0000] -5.01834*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -7.49895*** [0.0000] -7.18152*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -8.44689*** [0.0000] -8.35244*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -6.88925*** [0.0000] -6.38045*** [0.0000]
The numbers in brackets denote p-values. The LLC and IPS tests are the panel unit root test of Levin et al. (2002)
and Im et al. (2003), respectively, performed using the Newey–West bandwidth selection with Barlett Kernel, and
the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion is used to determine to optimal lag length. *, ** and *** indicate rejection of
the null hypothesis at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
All (98) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 10672.99 67804.5 128.237 14145.37 1.576145 4.612506 819.0915* 1568
ITARR 0.612896 11.19878 0.001676 1.156 5.39709 39.65699 95402.93* 1568
ITEXP 376.3349 22462.88 1.087189 851.1204 14.0744 322.5176 6721746* 1568
ITRCPT 474.409 7733.959 0.211532 647.9018 2.677959 16.58524 13931.98* 1568
GDPPCGR 0.028263 0.322496 -0.192922 0.039838 -0.021168 9.191927 2504.994* 1568
ITARRGR -0.027719 1.285837 -3.187505 0.24114 -3.851872 47.16394 131307* 1568
ITEXPGR -0.01055 2.391994 -4.056758 0.287179 -1.798854 39.42994 87552.18* 1568
ITRCPTGR -0.00486 3.486144 -3.693053 0.300824 -0.916928 37.57509 78321.58* 1568
LFPR 62.18304 89.6 40.2 9.046837 0.434307 3.638251 75.90787* 1568
GFCF 22.49449 74.8206 2.42436 6.468157 1.340439 9.076116 2881.611* 1568
TRADE 82.63711 439.657 14.9328 46.48579 2.864539 18.27516 17388.65* 1568
Democratic (66) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 14414.75 67804.5 203.053 15509.73 1.113801 3.22553 220.5754* 1056
ITARR 0.581091 8.789772 0.001676 0.708935 4.213261 36.26021 51798.89* 1056
ITEXP 426.6602 3261.766 1.087189 527.7268 1.982339 7.456105 1565.324* 1056
ITRCPT 538.8883 4259.059 1.676084 594.2463 1.875461 7.893876 1672.855* 1056
GDPPCGR 0.024163 0.150109 -0.192922 0.036455 -0.843171 6.958935 814.7443* 1056
ITARRGR -0.021542 1.109634 -2.289284 0.179259 -2.66923 33.60166 42458.26* 1056
ITEXPGR 0.005098 2.391994 -2.23065 0.227258 1.060532 33.98314 42435.98* 1056
ITRCPTGR 0.004979 1.704141 -2.398752 0.219831 -1.07386 24.01315 19631.26* 1056
LFPR 61.21752 83.4 41 6.391246 0.144499 3.776868 30.22994* 1056
GFCF 22.43741 74.8206 5.38532 5.834778 2.138966 13.8388 5974.329* 1056
TRADE 80.91521 209.891 14.9328 34.47269 0.583907 2.928754 60.23014* 1056
Non–democratic (32) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 2955.623 34378.9 128.237 5323.753 3.542489 16.57037 4999.505 512
ITARR 0.678496 11.19878 0.001814 1.747536 4.118651 20.70113 8131.911 512
ITEXP 272.5389 22462.88 1.216888 1276.876 12.7043 199.0947 834106.6 512
ITRCPT 341.4204 7733.959 0.211532 729.3053 3.854143 26.33616 12885.2 512
GDPPCGR 0.03672 0.322496 -0.155308 0.044906 0.688853 10.09238 1113.6 512
ITARRGR -0.040458 1.285837 -3.187505 0.334261 -3.505746 32.99917 20247.7 512
ITEXPGR -0.042826 1.597482 -4.056758 0.380428 -2.677258 29.33492 15406.91 512
ITRCPTGR -0.025152 3.486144 -3.693053 0.420858 -0.606085 26.3205 11633.39 512
LFPR 64.17441 89.6 40.2 12.67863 0.091287 2.179024 15.08981 512
GFCF 22.61221 57.7091 2.42436 7.614878 0.513988 4.67487 82.38772 512
TRADE 86.18853 439.657 17.8586 64.45404 2.994865 14.02607 3358.958 512
GDPPC, ITARR, ITEXP and ITRCPT , denote per capita per capita real GDP (in 2005 US$), per capita
tourist arrivals, per capita tourism expenditures, and per capita international tourism receipts, respectively, and
GDPPCGR, ITARRGR, ITEXPGR and ITRCPTGR are the aforementioned series’ growth rates (i.e. first
difference of natural logarithm). LFPR, GFCF and TRADE denote labour force participation, gross fixed
capital formation as a % of GDP and imports plus exports as a % GDP, respectively. JB denote Jarque-Bera. *
indicates 1 percent level of significance.
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